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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT1
Century joins the Debtor’s Motion2 to the extent that it requests that the Court establish a
near-term bar date. A bar date of May 31, 2021—four months and over 120 days from the
Court’s hearing date on this motion—provides claimants more than sufficient time to prepare to
file their claim. This Court has the authority to fix a bar date prior to the expiration of the
revived statute of limitations period. Here, as discussed below, the balance of equities requires
it.
In other key respects, Century objects to the terms of the proposed Bar Date Order. The
plaintiff firms behind the Tort Committee have demanded all of the benefits that flow to them
under Section 502, but have had the Debtor strip from its proposed Bar Date Order the
protections that the statutory scheme affords to prevent over claiming. Thus, the Tort Committee
demands that proofs of claim be given prima facie validity upon the mere filing of a form (a)
without ensuring that the form elicits sufficient information to state a prima facie claim against
the Diocese 3 and (b) while insisting that the proofs of claim be kept entirely secret, negating the
transparency that Section 502 mandates to give all parties notice of all claims asserted and a full
opportunity to investigate and challenge them. At the same time, the Tort Committee demanded
that the Diocese adopt a Bar Date Order that excuses the claimants from even having to sign the

1

Unless otherwise stated, all emphasis is added and internal quotation marks and citations are omitted.

2

The “Motion” is the Debtor’s Motion re: (i) establishing deadlines to file proofs of claim against the
Diocese, including but not limited to all claims of setoff or recoupment and claims arising under
Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code; (ii) approving the form and manner of notice of the Bar
Dates; (iii) approving the proposed forms to be used for filing proofs of claim; (iv) approving
procedures for maintaining the confidentiality of certain claims; (v) authorizing the Diocese to
publish notice of the Bar Dates; and (vi) granting related relief (Oct. 14, 2020) [ECF No. 74].

3

The “Diocese” refers to the Debtor, the Diocese of Camden, New Jersey.

1
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proofs of claim and instead invites counsel with no personal knowledge of the facts to sign the
proofs of claim.
The proposed Bar Date Order violates the scheme Section 502 creates and replaces it
with a Star Chamber process that employs a secret claims registry, secret assertions and the
automatic grant of prima facie validity without the claimant even having to sign. The result is
detrimental not only to the Debtor itself, but most importantly to the abuse survivors with valid
claims, as it invites the filing of meritless claims.
Century urges the Court to: (1) order all claimants to sign the proof of claim forms; (2)
require the transparency associated with the filing of proofs of claims in all other bankruptcies;
and (3) require the proof of claim form to include sufficient detail to state a prima facie case
against the Diocese. Alternatively, the Bar Date Order should be modified to make clear the
filing of a proof of claim preserves a filer’s claim but does not confer automatic prima facie
validity.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT IS WELL WITHIN ITS AUTHORITY TO SET A PROMPT BAR
DATE
A.

The Bankruptcy Rules Authorize the Court to Set a Prompt Bar Date

A bar date of May 31, 2021—four months and over 120 days from the Court’s hearing
date on this motion—provides claimants more than sufficient time to prepare to file their claim.
Indeed, by the time the proposed May 31, 2021 bar date occurs, claimants will have had over 17
months from the date the legislature enacted the revival statute in 2019 and over seven months
since this Chapter 11 case began to contemplate pursuing their claims.
Bankruptcy courts considering this issue conclude that not only do they have the
authority to fix a bar date prior to the expiration of the revived statute of limitations period but

2
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that the balance of equities requires it. In In re The Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis,
Case No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn., Apr. 17, 2015) [ECF No. 161], the debtor filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy in January 2015 and requested a bar date of August 3, 2015. Plaintiffs’ counsel
objected, arguing that because Minnesota’s Child Victim’s Act left “the legislatively-created
window for asserting child sexual abuse claims open until May 25, 2016,” the debtor’s “request
for a claims bar date earlier than May 25, 2016 effectively asks this Court to disregard the recent
legislation and prematurely ‘close the window’ on sexual abuse claims against the Archdiocese,”
and that “[s]uch a request flies in the face of the clear intent of the Minnesota legislature”—
exactly the argument the Committee advances here. Id. at ECF No. 175. The Minnesota
bankruptcy court summarily rejected plaintiffs’ argument and set a bar date for August 3, 2015—
more than eight months before the statutory window closed. Id. at ECF No. 188.
In a similar case, the court in In re: The Roman Catholic Diocese of Syracuse, Case No.
20-30663 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2020) [ECF No. 214], granted the debtor’s motion to set a
bar date prior to the end of the revival window, rejecting the Committee’s objection that the
court must set a bar date no earlier than August 14, 2021, the date to which New York’s Child
Victims Act extended the statute of limitations for survivors of childhood sexual abuse. Instead,
the court set a bar date for April 15, 2021, four months earlier than the close of the revival
window. Id.
In another New York case, In re: The Diocese of Rochester, Case No. 19-20905-PRW
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 29, 2020), when Governor Cuomo extended the statute of limitations set
in the Child Victims Act for COVID-19 related reasons, the Committee moved the court to
extend the original bar date of August 13, 2020 to January 2021. The court denied the
Committee’s motion to extend the bar date, explaining,

3
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The Court has balanced the potential harm to unknown victims of childhood
sexual abuse, if the claims bar date remains unchanged, against the harm to the
Estate (by requiring additional noticing, with the additional attendant costs) and
the harm to those abuse victims who have already filed proofs of claim (adding
unnecessary delay to the ultimate resolution of their claims). The balancing of
harms weighs in favor of not extending the claims bar date beyond August 13,
2020 at 11:59 P.M. (prevailing Eastern time).
Id.4
The same result is warranted here. Delay of the bar date beyond May 31, 2021 will not
only jeopardize the Diocese’s ability to reorganize successfully but will also stall the process of
investigating claims, which will be detrimental to the claimants given the high administrative
costs and the parties’ need to determine the universe of claims and investigate them as soon as
possible.
Establishing a prompt deadline for filing proofs of claim is of paramount importance.5
As courts often note, “the setting of a bar date for filing claims . . . furthers the policy of finality
designed to protect the interests of a debtor and his diligent creditors and the expeditious
administration of the bankruptcy case.” In re Peters, 90 B.R. 588, 597 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1988).
The establishment of a filing deadline here is necessary to enable the Debtor to ascertain with
certainty the universe of claims asserted by its creditors, including the total number of claimants
and the aggregate value of their respective claims.6

4

In addition to sexual abuse cases, claimants in asbestos cases or other similar instances routinely face
filing deadlines prior to expiration of a statute of limitations period. See, e.g., In re G-I Holdings,
Inc., 443 B.R. 645, 665-68 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (determining that certain claims were allowable in
asbestos bankruptcy case because statute of limitations had not expired, while other claims were not
allowable because statute of limitations had expired).

5

See In re Best Products Co., Inc., 140 B.R. 353, 357 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (a claim-filing deadline
is “an integral step in the reorganization process”); In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc., 465 B.R.
38, 46 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (a bar date “contributes to one of the main purposes of bankruptcy law,
securing, within a limited time, the prompt and effectual administration and settlement of the
Debtor’s estate”) (quoting In re Smidth & Co., 413 B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009)).

6

See In re Victory Mem’l Hosp., 435 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“A bar date serves the
important purpose of enabling the parties to a bankruptcy case to identify with reasonable promptness

4
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A bar date is a prerequisite step before (1) the Debtor can determine the best way to
structure a plan of reorganization in this Chapter 11 case and (2) investigate the claims asserted
against it.
As the Fourth Circuit observed in Vancouver Women’s Health Soc. v. A.H. Robins Co.:
In bankruptcy, the court has an obligation not only to the potential claimants, but
also to existing claimants and the petitioner’s stockholders. The court must
balance the needs of notification of potential claimants with the interest of
existing creditors and claimants. A bankrupt estate’s resources are always limited
and the bankruptcy court must use discretion in balancing these interests . . . .
820 F.2d 1359, 1364 (4th Cir. 1987).
Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3) gives the Court the discretion to set a May 31, 2021 bar date.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3003; In re Hooker Invest., Inc., 122 B.R. 659, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The
setting of a bar date pursuant to Rule 3003(c) and the grant or denial of an extension of time to
file a proof of claim are matters within the discretion of the bankruptcy court.”).
B.

A Near Term Bar Date Is More Than Justified by the Facts

The Estate is burdened with significant administrative expenses, in large measure because
the tort claimants have demonstrated little restraint on spending. Despite the Committee’s
argument that a few months’ delay will have a de minimis effect compared to the emotional
trauma the survivors must bear, a near-term bar date is imperative for the Debtor to be able to
compensate these survivors adequately. In addition to the delay of the reorganization until the
bar date passes, the Debtor will continue to incur significant Chapter 11 administrative expenses
including United States Trustee fees, legal fees for its own counsel, and legal fees for counsel to
the Committee, dissipating funds that might otherwise be used to satisfy abuse victims. As the

the identity of those making claims against the bankruptcy estate, and the general amount of the
claims, a necessary step in achieving the goal of successful reorganization.”).

5
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chart below demonstrates, each month this Chapter 11 case is outstanding, the Estate will incur
hundreds of thousands of dollars in professional fees. In addition to the fees detailed below, the
Committee’s law firm has informed the Court that it intends to charge the Estate up to $1500 and
$750 per hour for each partner and associate’s time, respectively. [ECF No. 278.] Of course,
such costly fees will only serve to deplete the Estate’s assets until the bar date passes and this
case is able to reach resolution.

The practical impact of a late November 2021 bar date is that it will lead to a protracted
and expensive Chapter 11 process that may jeopardize the Diocese’s ability to successfully
reorganize and will result in a smaller distribution for abuse survivors. Specifically, if the bar
date does not occur until November 2021, it will take at least an additional six to 12 months to
gather additional information necessary to understand and evaluate the universe of abuse claims
asserted against the Diocese. Thus, there will be little to no prospect of a successful
reorganization plan being formulated, let alone brought to confirmation, until mid-2022.

6
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As explained above, the November 2021 bar date proposed by the Committee would be
detrimental to not only the Debtor, but also to the survivors themselves, significantly increasing
the ongoing professional fees and depleting the Estate’s assets needed to compensate the
claimants.
II.

IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE PROOFS OF CLAIM BE SIGNED BY
CLAIMANTS
A.

Sworn Statements from Claimants Are Particularly Important
in Mass Tort Cases

It is particularly crucial in the context of a mass tort personal injury case that the claimant
verify the claims under penalty of perjury. 7 Claimants have personal knowledge of the events
that they are describing in the proof of claim form; their attorneys do not. Thus, the effect of
sworn statements from attorneys, who have no personal knowledge, affirming that they have
“examined the information in this Sexual Abuse Survivor Proof of Claim and have a reasonable
belief that the information is true and correct” is much less significant than sworn statements
from the claimants themselves.
The sheer number of claims makes independent verification of the information provided
by claimants challenging—here, there may be significant impediments to testing claims like they
would be tested in the tort system. It is an essential protection that the statements made in the
proofs of claim are true, correct, and verified by the person making the claim as such. Anything
less than that raises the specter that parties may not rely on the veracity of the claim forms.

7

The Third Circuit has admonished courts to apply “careful and comprehensive scrutiny” in overseeing
mass tort bankruptcies. In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 693–94 (3d Cir. 2005).

7
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The Court Has Authority Under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy to Order
Claimants to Sign the Proofs of Claim

Although Official Form 410 provides for the possibility that a claimant’s agent may sign
the form, Bankruptcy Rule 3001 permits modification of the Official Form, and provides only
that the parties use a form that “conform[s] substantially” to the same. The Court’s authority to
modify the Official Form, particularly in mass tort cases, is well-established. In re A.H. Robins
Co., 862 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 158 B.R. 713, 716 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1993). Indeed, all parties here contemplate modifications to the Official Form, as has
become the typical practice in abuse-based bankruptcies. In several of those cases, the Court
signed a bar date order and approved a claim requiring claimant signatures. Similarly, this Court
should order all claimants to sign the proof of claim forms to ensure their accuracy and to
prevent the need for further discovery. See, e.g., In re Diocese of Harrisburg, Case No. 1:20-bk00599 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2020) [ECF No. 223-2] (approving bar date and abuse proof of claim
form stating: “To be valid, this proof of claim must: . . . be signed by the sexual abuse claimant,
except if that if the sexual abuse claimant is a minor, incapacitated, or deceased, this sexual
abuse proof of claim may be signed by the sexual abuse claimant’s parent, legal guardian, or
executor, as applicable.”); In re Archdiocese of New Orleans, Case No. 20-10846 (E.D. La. Oct.
1, 2020) [ECF No. 461] (approving bar date and abuse proof of claim form stating: “For this
claim to be valid, the Sexual Abuse Survivor must sign this form. If the Sexual Abuse Survivor
is deceased or incapacitated, the form must be signed by the Sexual Abuse Survivor’s
representative or the attorney for the Sexual Abuse Survivor’s estate.”).

8
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THE PROPOSED CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS ARE OVERBROAD AND
CONFLICT WITH THE STATUTORY SCHEME ESTABLISHED BY SECTION
502 FOR CHALLENGING CLAIMS
The foundation for the application of the statutory process for the submission, review,

and challenge of proofs of claim adopted by Section 502 is transparency. A creditor seeking to
make a claim on a bankruptcy estate is required to file a proof of claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 501. That the proofs of claim be subject to challenge—and hence usable as part of the
investigation and adjudication of disputed claims—is an essential part of this legislative scheme.8
Under the scheme envisioned in Section 502, the proofs of claim and the information contained
in them must be usable in the investigation and adjudication of the claims. And all parties in
interest must have notice of the claims asserted. This is one of the purposes of a public claims
registry.
The confidentiality protocol proposed in the Debtor’s Bar Date Order is so overprotective as to preclude the use of the information found in the proofs of claim to sufficiently
verify or challenge them through the process mandated by Section 502. For example, under the
confidentiality procedure the Diocese proposes, no party in interest may share the proofs of
claim with an outside expert to analyze or evaluate the claims, and no party in interest will have
the opportunity to speak to other witnesses or otherwise develop evidence that requires speaking
to anyone other than “Authorized Parties” about the matter. Nor are parties in interest even

8

The need for transparency in mass tort cases has been emphasized by the Department of Justice as
recently as December 28, 2020 when it filed a Statement of Interest in an asbestos bankruptcy case in
the Western District of North Carolina. The U.S. Attorney in that case explained: “In recent years,
numerous courts and commentators have recognized that many asbestos claims are based on
inaccurate or even fraudulent information . . . . That lack of transparency in the compensation of
asbestos claims has been a significant problem.” Justice Department Files Statement of Interest
Urging Transparency in the Compensation of Asbestos Claims, Justice News (Dec. 28, 2020),
available at, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-files-statement-interest-urgingtransparency-compensation-asbestos-claims.

9
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given notice as to who has asserted a claim against the Debtor and for what, as the entire registry
of claims is sealed.
The preclusive measures proposed are contrary to the statutory procedure for challenging
claims envisioned under Section 502.9 See In re Brunson, 486 B.R. 759, 771 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2013) (“[A] debtor seeking more information from a creditor respecting its proof of claim may
take depositions orally or by written questions, serve interrogatories, requests for production, and
requests for admission.”); In re Rosebud Farm, Inc., 619 B.R. 202, 209 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2020)
(finding that a party to the contested matter created by an objection to a proof of claim “has had
all the regular means of discovery available to him throughout this contested matter”); In re
Davenport, 544 B.R. 245, 251 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2015) (“The filing of an objection to claim creates
a ‘contested matter’ under Bankruptcy Rule 9014. The provisions for formal litigation discovery
apply in a contested matter, unless the court directs otherwise. See Bankruptcy Rule 9014(c).
Therefore, a debtor seeking more information from a creditor respecting its proof of claim may
take depositions orally or by written questions, serve interrogatories, requests for production, and
requests for admission.”).
To ensure that the adjudication process in this Chapter 11 case aligns with the statutory
scheme set out in Section 502, Century requests that the Bar Date Order be revised either to
make clear that the filing of a proof of claim is for the limited purpose of preserving a claimant’s
rights but not grant presumptive validity or, alternatively, if presumptive validity is sought from
the claims registrar, filings and process shall be transparent, as envisioned by Section 502.
Further, the proposed bar date should be revised to include: (1) as “Authorized Parties” all

9

See In re Best Products Co., Inc., 140 B.R. 353, 357 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“A personal injury
claimant is given no special dispensation. The claimant must comply with the Code, the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and court orders for claims handling procedure . . . .”).

10
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insurers and their counsel, experts and consultants, without conditioning this designation on the
Debtor’s consent; and (2) a provision that permits Authorized Parties to use the proof of claim
forms to evaluate and investigate the claims.
First, it is undisputed that insurers in this case have a significant interest in evaluating the
claims at issue, and Century and other insurers must have direct access to all proofs of claim.
The Debtor’s proposed Bar Date Order currently provides that an Authorized Party includes:
“Upon the consent of the Diocese, any insurance company that provided insurance or reinsurance
that may cover the claims described in any Abuse Proof of Claim, together with their respective
successors, reinsurers and counsel.” Proposed Bar Date Order ¶ 13(c)(iv) [ECF No. 74-2].
Century objects to this provision, which gives the Diocese unilateral authority to provide—or to
decline to provide—the insurers with the proofs of claim necessary to determine the Diocese’s
liability in this case. Such a provision directly violates Century’s due process rights to evaluate
the claims and to determine its own liability. The Bar Date Order must include insurers and their
counsel in the definition of “Authorized Parties.”
Next, as the Court is aware, experts and outside consultants are vital to the evaluation of
claims, especially in a mass tort case such as this with claims that will be decades old. The Bar
Date Order currently does not provide for the use of experts to evaluate the claims and Century
asks that the Bar Date Order include experts and outside consultants in the definition of
“Authorized Parties.”
In addition, as discussed above, Section 502 permits the parties to adjudicate and
investigate the claims asserted against the Debtor. The proposed Confidentiality Agreement
provides:
Recipient may use Confidential Proofs of Claim, and any Confidential Information
contained therein, only in connection with the evaluation, prosecution or defense
11
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of the claims asserted in such Confidential Proofs of Claim in the Diocese’s Chapter
11 Case, any related adversary proceedings or contested matters in the Chapter 11
Case, any related insurance or reinsurance coverage demands, claims, disputes, or
litigation, and settlement negotiations or mediations regarding all of the foregoing,
and as otherwise required by applicable federal or state laws or regulations (each,
a “Permitted Use”).
See Proposed Bar Date Order, Ex. C ¶ 4 [ECF No. 74-2]. Century requests that the Bar Date
Order clarify that this provision permits Authorized Parties to use the proofs of claim in the
investigation of the claims, in questioning witnesses, as exhibits at depositions, and in any other
manner necessary to properly evaluate and adjudicate the claims. 10
In the alternative, Century asks that the Bar Date Order include the following provision:
All Authorized Parties are authorized to discuss the contents of any Abuse Proof
of Claim, (other than the claimant’s name, address, and other information which
could reasonably be used to personally identify an Abuse Claimant or any witness
to the abuse disclosed in the Abuse Proof of Claim Form), with any person the
Authorized Party deems necessary to evaluate and investigate the merits of the
claim.
The proposed provision is substantially similar to one that the Diocese included for its
own investigation of claims.11 As a party in interest, Century should have the same opportunity
to investigate the merits of the claims.
Finally, the statements in the form of proof of claim that address the availability of the
proofs of claim should conform to the text of the Bar Date Order.

10

To this end, Century specifically objects to the prohibition in the Bar Date Order stating: “Authorized
Parties may not contact a witness identified in an Abuse Proof of Claim Form based upon information
obtained solely from the Abuse Proof of Claim Form.” Proposed Bar Date Order ¶ 13(e) [ECF No.
74-2].

11

The proposed Bar Date Order provides: “that the Diocese is authorized to discuss the contents of any
Abuse Proof of Claim, (other than the claimant’s name, address, and other information identified in
Parts 1 and 2(a) of the Abuse Proof of Claim Form, the signature block and any other information
which could reasonably be used to personally identify an Abuse Claimant or any witness to the abuse
disclosed in the Abuse Proof of Claim Form), with a person identified as an alleged abuser who was
not previously disclosed to the Diocese as an individual who had committed an act of abuse . . . .”
Proposed Bar Date Order ¶ 13(c)(i) [ECF No. 74-2].

12
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THE QUESTIONS POSED IN THE PROOF OF CLAIM ARE INSUFFICIENT
TO CONFER PRIMA FACIE VALIDITY OF THE CLAIM
The questions posed in the proposed proof of claim are insufficient to plead a prima facie

claim. This is another reason why the Bar Date Order should include text specifying the
submission of proofs of claim is adequate to preserve a claim and nothing more.
A.

Presumptive Validity

Only “a claim that alleges facts sufficient to support a legal liability to the claimant
satisfies the claimant’s initial obligation to go forward.” In re Allegheny, Int’l, Inc., 954 F.2d
167, 173 (3d Cir. 1992); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f). The assertions in the filed claim must meet
this standard of sufficiency to be considered prima facie valid under Section 502(a). Allegheny,
954 F.2d at 173; see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001. In other words, “the allegations of the proof of
claim are taken as true,” and if those “allegations set forth all the necessary facts to establish a
claim and are not self-contradictory, they prima facie establish the claim.” In re Holm, 931 F.3d
620, 623 (3d Cir. 1991).
By contrast, where a proof of claim “does not adhere to the requirements of Rule 3001 by
providing facts and documents necessary to support the claim, it is not entitled to the
presumption of prima facie validity.” In re Kincaid, 388 B.R. 610, 614 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008).
See also In re Jorczak, 314 B.R. 474, 481 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2004) (“If . . . the claimant fails to
allege facts in the proof of claim that are sufficient to support the claim, e.g., by failing to attach
sufficient documentation to comply with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(c), the claim is . . . deprived of
any prima facie validity which it could otherwise have obtained.”).
The Committee has asserted that its objective is to avoid intrusive questions. The
objective may be laudable, but the result is a form that unambiguously—indeed, indisputably—
fails to establish a prima facie cause of actionable abuse against the Diocese.
13
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No claimant in any other civil litigation context—including those asserting sexual abuse
claims—receives such special pleading treatment. 12 And nothing in the Bankruptcy Code
justifies such an exception for the pleading standard and substantive proof of these claims or any
others. To the contrary, the substantive standard is properly established solely by state law and
cannot be supplanted by special bankruptcy standards. See In re Lafferty, Case No. 11-27292
(JHW), 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5871, at *9 (Bankr. D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2012) (“The ‘basic federal rule’
in bankruptcy is that state law governs the substance of claims.”) (quoting Raleigh v. Illinois
Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000)); In re USG Corp., 290 B.R. 223, 225 (Bankr. D. Del.
2003) (“An unbroken line of authority holds that state law claims remain governed by state law,
even after the debtor invokes federal bankruptcy protection.”).
Because a “claim against the bankruptcy estate . . . ‘will not be allowed in a bankruptcy
proceeding if the same claim would not be enforceable against the debtor outside of
bankruptcy,’” In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 245 n.66 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Sanford, 979 F.2d 1511, 1513 (11th Cir. 1992)), sexual abuse and other tort
claimants are subjected to the same proof standards they would face outside of bankruptcy, even
when such proof is potentially intrusive or embarrassing (matters that can be handled through
confidentiality protocols as in any other civil litigation context). Under the Code, the form can
establish a presumptively valid claim only if it provides the information required to state a claim
under applicable substantive law. Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 245 n.66.

12

See, e.g., In re USA Gymnastics, Case No. 18-09108 (RLM) (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Feb. 25, 2018) [ECF
No. 301] (approving proof of claim form for claimants asserting c laims relating to sexual misconduct
that required claimants to, among other things, provide documentation and written responses to
approximately thirty separate questions regarding the nature of their claims, the damages asserted,
their connections to the debtors, and the procedural history of their asserted claims); In re Nortel
Networks, Inc., 469 B.R. 478, 497 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standards to a proof
of claim involving tort claims, noting that greater specificity required).

14
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While the Debtor’s proposed form solicits information that may be sufficient for a tort
claim against an actual abuser, it falls short of soliciting the type and range of information
necessary to establish the Diocese’s liability as an organization for the underlying conduct, and
in turn, the insurers’ potential coverage obligations. Among other things, the form fails to ask
the claimant to affirm either that the Diocese knew about the abuser or that the claimant has
evidence of that knowledge. Under New Jersey law, such an omission would be fatal to a claim
against the Diocese. See Davis v. Devereux Found., 209 N.J. 269, 292 (2012) (explaining New
Jersey courts recognize the tort of negligent hiring “where the employee either knew or should
have known that the employee was violent or aggressive, or that the employee might engage in
injurious conduct toward third persons”); G.A.-H. v. K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401, 416, reconsideration
denied, 239 N.J. 76 (2019) (for negligent supervision or training, the claimant must prove that
“(1) an employer knew or had reason to know that the failure to supervise or train an employee
in a certain way would create a risk of harm and (2) that risk of harm materializes and causes the
plaintiff’s damages”); Ianuale v. Borough of Keyport, Civ. No. 16-9147 (FLW) (LHG), 2018
WL 5005005, at *13 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2018) (dismissing negligent hiring claim where “Plaintiffs
have not presented any facts at summary judgment indicating that Defendants had reason to
know of any ‘particular unfitness, incompetence, or dangerous attributes’ of any of the
Defendants”).
The centrality of a defendant organization’s knowledge of or notice about a particular
individual demonstrates that the Debtor’s proposed proof of claim form is inadequate to support
a prima facie claim. With this major element missing, the form fails to elicit facts sufficient to
support legal liability against the Diocese.

15
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If the Committee intends to invoke presumptive validity under Section 502 and Rule
3001, more detailed questions and documentary support would be required to satisfy the
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. The proof of claim form must elicit all of the information
necessary to state all elements of liability and damages, including detailed information to
establish not only the Diocese’s liability and that of its co-defendants, but also when the abuse or
injury took place and the extent to which the Diocese’s representatives had knowledge of, or
were warned about, a particular perpetrator. The Debtor’s proof of claim does not do this.
Other bankruptcy courts have recognized the need for more detailed information when
mass tort claims are at issue. 13 See In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 862 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir. 1988); In
re The Delaco Co., No. 04-10899 (CB) [ECF No. 196]. In A.H. Robins, the district court (sitting
in bankruptcy) established a two-step process by which claimants would first file a statement of
intent to make a certain type of claim along with their name and address, and then later would be
required to fill out a detailed questionnaire. Id. at 1093. The questionnaire requested
information related to the claim, such as dates of use of the product, the type of injury alleged,
and details about any medical attention sought. Id. The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s
decision to disallow claimants who failed to complete the questionnaire on the grounds that,
without answers to the questionnaire’s more detailed inquiries, the “initial statement of intention
to make a claim would be insufficient as valid proof of claim.” Id. at 1096.
The court in In re: The Roman Catholic Diocese of Syracuse, Case No. 20-30663 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2020) [ECF No. 214], took a similar approach when it allowed all claimants to
submit an Official Form 410 but ordered that in addition:

13

See A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 862 F.2d 1092, 1095 (4th Cir. 1988) (deeming detailed questionnaires in
addition to a proof of claim “essential”).
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Any proof of claim asserting a Sexual Abuse Claim . . . should be accompanied
by a completed Confidential Sexual Abuse Claim Supplement. . . . The failure to
submit a completed Confidential Sexual Abuse Claim Supplement with any
proof of claim asserting a Sexual Abuse Claim may be the basis for a valid
objection to such claim.
Id. (emphasis in original).
In resolving this issue, the Court must balance the Committee’s desire to limit the
rehashing of potentially traumatic events for survivors with the need to elicit sufficient
information to state a prima facie claim under the Code. One way to manage these conflicting
concerns is to include language in the Bar Date Order treating the form as a claim-preservation
and information-gathering device only, rather than as a statement of a presumptively valid claim.
If, however, the Committee intends for the proof of claim forms to establish prima facie claims
against the Diocese, a more comprehensive form is needed.
B.

Evaluation of Claims

In addition to separating compounded questions to ensure claimants answer all questions
in an easily readable format, Century proposes adding questions to elicit the following:


A detailed explanation of work history. This information will assist the Diocese
to corroborate the allegations and will assist the Diocese and the insurers to
establish the claimant’s measure of damages, as abuse claimants often allege loss
of income and/or loss of earning capacity.



A standalone question asking when the abuse happened to ensure the Diocese and
insurers are able to identify the year the alleged abuse occurred, a critical issue for
the insurers given the separate coverage for various years.



Information about the survivor’s relationship to the abuser to assist in identifying
the alleged abuser.



Detailed information about whether and to whom the survivor reported the abuse,
if at all, any investigation that was done at the time, and the contact information
of any possible witnesses. This will help the Diocese and the insurers identify
any corroborating evidence in support of the claimant’s allegations and will
indicate if the Diocese had prior notice of allegations of abuse.

17
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A question regarding the Diocese’s knowledge of the abuse. 14 This information
directly implicates the Diocese’s liability because claimants often bring claims
under legal theories of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention.

Without the pertinent information from the additional questions requested herein, no
party in interest could reasonably assess the claims, which will lead to substantial discovery.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Century objects in part to the Debtor’s motion.

14

Under New Jersey law, claims of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention require proof that: (a)
the Diocese “knew or had reason to know of the particular unfitness, incompetence or dangerous
attributes of the employee and could reasonably have foreseen that such qualities created a risk of
harm to other persons;” and (b) as a result of the Diocese’s negligence, the employee’s
“incompetence, unfitness or dangerous characteristics proximately caused the injury.” See G.A.-H. v.
K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401, 416 (2019).
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